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1. Introduction 
Although motor bodily injury (BI) insurance claims are less frequent than those with only 
material damages, they represent the largest cumulative costs for motor insurers. 
Moreover, BI claims show a high variability in payments. Therefore, in most countries 
motor BI claims are not included in direct reimbursement systems (i.e. no-fault systems), 
and consequently, road traffic victims with personal damages must be compensated by the 
insurer of the driver responsible for the accident. 
In general terms, if there are no discrepancies about who is at fault for the accident, 
insurers will attempt to reach a friendly agreement with the claimant as regards financial 
compensation. The compensation offered by the insurer in the negotiation process depends 
on the claim information available, and especially on the medical reports. The insurance 
company’s medical staff evaluate the personal damage to the victim in successive 
examinations during his/her recovery, and when the insurance company has to negotiate 
the compensation, its monetary offer is mainly based on the information gathered during 
these examinations. In contrast, the sum requested by the claimant is founded on his/her 
own evidence (e.g. loss of earnings, independent medical reports and so forth).  
When the two parties fail to reach an agreement on the claim compensation amount, 
the lawsuit will go to court and the compensation will be established by judicial verdict. In 
countries like the UK or the USA only 1% of claims are settled by judicial verdict (Lewis, 
2006; Derrig and Rempala, 2006). In Spain, from where the database used in this paper 
was obtained, the percentage of motor BI claims settled in court rises to 5-10% of cases, 
depending on the insurance company. Most compensation payments are therefore the result 
of a negotiation process between parties. 
  
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                             Working Papers 2008/07, 24 pages
3
This paper analyzes the claim compensations awarded by courts in order to gain 
some insight into the compensation amount for which the BI claim could be settled prior to 
judicial decision. The aim was to estimate the maximum compensation amount that should 
be accepted by the insurer in the negotiation process (max offer). In particular, we consider 
that the expected BI claim compensation awarded by courts should be interpreted by the 
insurer as the maximum offer in the negotiation process. When the minimum 
compensation amount that the claimant is willing to accept is larger than this maximum 
offer, then the insurance company should decide to take it to court. 
In the actuarial literature there is relatively little empirical research regarding the 
negotiation process between the insurer and the claimant. Indeed, previous studies have 
normally only dealt implicitly with the negotiation issue, and have mainly focused on 
quantifying the effect of suspicion of fraud on the BI claim settlement, this effect being 
considered as the negotiation margin on the final compensation. Crocker and Tennyson 
(2002), for instance, show that insurers pay on average lower compensations on claims 
with a low falsification cost. Loughran (2005) demonstrates that insurers under-indemnify 
general damages when special damages exceed their expected value and vice versa. Other 
authors have dealt with the optimal level of claim investigation according to the potential 
for reducing the claim cost (D’Arcy, 2005; Viaene et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, some recent contributions have analyzed variables that are directly 
related to the negotiation of the claim compensation (Derrig and Weisberg, 2004; Derrig 
and Rempala, 2006). In Derrig and Weisberg (2004), BI claim settlements are explained by 
variables such as the claimant compensation demand or whether a suit was filed. The 
authors suggest that more aggressive demands for pain and suffering damages frequently 
obtain higher claim compensations. Derrig and Rempala (2006) consider the negotiation 
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process as a sequence of claimant demands and insurer offers until an agreement is 
reached. The authors fit a non-homogenous Poisson process to explain this stochastic 
process and show that two subsets of negotiations can be identified, fast and slow, which 
depend on the initial compensation demand or the period until the claim was reported, 
among other factors. 
In our study, we apply a log-linear model to estimate BI claims compensations 
awarded by courts. Groupwise heteroscedasticity and correlation in the error term are 
possible, the former being due to the forensic performance. Correlation among 
observations occurs when more than one claim is involved in the same judicial sentence. 
Results are obtained from an unbalanced dataset which consists of few observations per 
unit record (maximum three claimants per verdict). Due to the sample framework, 
Satterthwaite’s approximation (as implemented in SAS) does not perform correctly in 
order to construct confidence limits for the correlation parameter estimate. An alternative 
methodology based on generalized inference is thus applied for interval estimation (Tsui 
and Weerahandi, 1989). In particular, the Park-Burdick generalized confidence interval in 
the presence of groupwise heteroscedasticity is estimated (Park and Burdick, 2003; 2004).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. A brief overview of the BI claim 
handling process is presented in the next section. Section 3 describes the data used in the 
empirical analysis. Section 4 defines the log-linear model specification and gives the 
estimation results, including the generalized confidence interval in the correlation 
parameter estimate. An example is presented to illustrate the application of the model in 
estimating the maximum compensation amount in a deal between parties. Finally, in 
Section 5, we summarize the main findings and present some concluding remarks.  
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2. Automobile liability insurance claim handling process 
Automobile liability insurance covers any damage as a result of an automobile accident for 
which the insured driver was responsible. Two types of damages due to the accident should 
be distinguished: material consequences and damages to the person. The former include 
material damages (car, personal possessions, etc.) and also any incurred medical expenses 
or loss of earnings (both, past and future). Damage to the person includes bodily injury and 
pain and suffering, which is defined as the physical or emotional distress resulting from the 
injury. Material damages and medical expenses seem to be easily justified by the claimant 
and verified by the insurer, and consequently, few disputes related to the compensation 
amount for these concepts are expected. Denial of responsibility for the accident is, in 
principle, the only reason for litigation. In contrast, the assessment of loss of earnings and 
damages to the person is more controversial and often causes disputes between claimants 
and insurers. This paper focuses on these damages, which are referred to as bodily injury 
(BI) claims.  
BI claim handling refers to the process that starts when the accident occurrence is 
reported to the insurer and ends with the payment by the insurer for BI damages covered. 
The claim handling process (see Fig. 1) includes: i) the claim reporting, ii) the recovery 
period for the victim’s injury, and finally, iii) the settlement phase.   
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2.1 Claim reporting 
When an accident takes place, victims who are not responsible for it may claim 
compensation for damages. Several countries require that a judicial process be initiated in 
such circumstances. Indeed, victims must file a lawsuit in order to be entitled to the 
compensation payment. Some countries, such as Ireland, have set up a previous statutory 
body that is responsible for assessing compensations with the aim of reducing litigation. 
Only if parties reject the assessment is the action pursued through the courts system. In 
these cases it is also the victim who must make the application to the statutory body. Under 
Spanish law, victims have six months from the time of the accident in which to file the 
Figure 1. Insurance claim settlement process 
Motor accident
BI claim is reported
Injury recovery
Adjuster’s 
compensation offer
Claimant’s 
compensation demand
Claimant’s rejectionInsurer’s rejection
Court ruling
Compensation 
Agreement
Insurer’s acceptance
claimant’s acceptance
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lawsuit. Victims are entitled to claim only compensation for damages suffered, done by 
filing a tort suit, or also the punishment of the driver, for which a criminal suit is required. 
At this stage the insurer obtains general claim information related to the accident 
characteristics, such as the number and type of vehicles involved, whether there were BI 
victims and so forth. Unlike road accidents with material damages, accidents with victims 
are usually communicated to the insurer shortly after they occur. Nevertheless, BI claims 
may remain unsettled for several years before victims are indemnified. This is because, 
firstly, the victim must be fully recovered and, subsequently, the compensation amount 
must be either agreed upon between the parties, assessed by a statutory body or, in the last 
resort, set by judicial order. 
2.2 Recovery period 
During the period in which the victim is recovering, the insurer wishes to know the 
evolution of his/her BI damages. With this objective, medical experts (appointed by the 
insurer) evaluate the injury severity of the victim in successive examinations. In Spain, 
motor bodily injury compensations must be dealt with in accordance with a legislative 
disability scale. The disability scale consists of an injury scoring system and a 
compensation scale. The scoring system provides a range of possible sequelae1 resulting 
from the accident and sets a maximum-minimum score for each one according to the injury 
severity. The monetary amount is determined on the compensation scale, which depends 
on the total score of sequelae (positively) and the age of the victim (inversely). Other 
countries, such as France or Italy, have similar systems of compensation. Normally, the 
                                                 
1 Sequela is the definitive reduction of a person’s physical and/or mental potential that can be medically 
explained. 
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insurer’s medical experts make their evaluations fit with sequelae and severity scores 
defined in the legislative scoring system. 
The follow-up examinations carried out by the insurer are useful for reserving 
purposes during the time that the claim remains open. In Ayuso and Santolino (2007), for 
instance, this information is used to predict the final severity of the victim’s injury at 
different stages during the life of the claim and, subsequently, the authors show that the 
individual claim provision can be estimated according to the predicted severity. When the 
victim has recovered, the follow-up examinations provide the core information for 
determining the compensation amount to offer in the negotiation. When the lawsuit follows 
the criminal procedure, a forensic doctor also examines the recovered victim. Forensic 
doctors must describe the victim’s sequelae in accordance with the Spanish disability 
rating scale, but they are not obliged to measure severity by awarding a score; however, 
they may do so in order to assist the judge. 
2.3 The settlement phase: negotiation-litigation 
After the victim’s recovery, the insurer and the claimant start negotiation in order to reach 
an agreement on the BI compensation amount. Normally, this negotiation is carried out by 
a lawyer and a staff adjuster, acting on behalf of the claimant and the insurance company, 
respectively. The first proposal of compensation is commonly made by the staff adjuster 
who communicates an offer to the claimant’s lawyer. This compensation offer is based on 
the medical information available to the insurer; thus, the adjuster mainly assesses the 
claim by applying the compensation scale (provided in the legislative disability scale) to 
the severity score and number of recovery days considered by the medical expert in the last 
examination. 
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In contrast, the lawyer requests claimant compensation for BI damages according to 
the medical examinations presented by his client and other personal evidence. If the 
insurer’s offer satisfies the claimant’s demand, then the adjuster and the lawyer will reach 
a compensation agreement. Indeed, the claim is then settled and the handling process ends. 
However, the lawyer will refuse the offer when it is not sufficient to cover the claim. At 
this point, the lawyer has two options: to present a counter-demand of compensation or to 
stop the negotiation and wait for a court hearing. In the latter, the BI claim compensation 
will be settled by judicial decision. When the lawyer chooses to request a second claim, 
then the settlement decision shifts to the adjuster. As with the lawyer previously, the 
adjuster may now accept the counter-demand, refuse it and present a counter-offer, or wait 
for a court hearing. These rounds of negotiation are repeated until a compensation deal is 
reached, or the date for the court hearing arrives. 
The final result of the settlement process is uncertain and depends on multiple 
factors such as the negotiation strategies of both parties and whether or not the claimant is 
willing to wait until the court hearing for monetary compensation, and so on. Neither side 
in the negotiation has, in principle, a vested interest in the court option due to its associated 
higher costs and duration. Therefore, when the difference between the offer and demand 
amounts is not too large, the parties will be flexible in their respective positions in order to 
reach an agreement. However, determining how far the parties are willing to move from 
their initial positions before going to court is not an easy task. Indeed, despite the 
possibility of using game theory, i.e. the branch of science which deals with negotiation 
between agents and presents formal solutions (see Nelson Jr. 2002), factors other than 
strategies may play a role, for instance, the claimant’s financial situation. 
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In practice, the size of the increment from the initial offer to the final one depends 
on the negotiation experience of the adjuster and his skill in bargaining with the lawyer, as 
well, of course, on the lawyer’s ability. Adjuster supervisors can monitor the performance 
of their adjuster teams and offer them general guidelines in the negotiation strategy. 
However, adjusters have broad autonomy during the negotiation process in decisions 
regarding increments of the offer. In the last resort, they also decide the maximum 
compensation to offer in the negotiation and, therefore, to go to court when this amount is 
exceeded. In this paper we develop an automated tool which helps the insurer’s adjuster to 
estimate the maximum offer in the negotiation process. The model regressors relate to BI 
claim information collected by the insurer during the claim handling process.  
3. Spanish bodily injury claims database 
The dataset consists of 114 Spanish motor BI claims settled by judicial decision between 
2001 and 2003. The database was provided by a Spanish insurer who was legally 
responsible for compensation payments. Each claim record represents a victim whom the 
insurer had to compensate for bodily injury damages. Some of these claims were judged in 
the same trial. In particular, there are 4 judicial verdicts involving three BI claims each, 14 
involving two, and 74 verdicts involving only one claim. In total, the 114 BI claims were 
settled by 92 judicial verdicts or, in other words, around 20% of court verdicts relate to 
more than one victim.   
Since insurer and plaintiff negotiate the compensation amount when the victim is 
fully recovered, we assume that the insurer followed up the victim during the recovery 
period and that at the time of negotiation the insurance company has the whole claim 
information available. In particular, it is assumed that the insurer’s medical experts 
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examined the victim at the beginning and end of the recovery period and wrote up an initial 
and final medical report, respectively. Explanatory variables included in the model are 
presented in Table 1. We also show some descriptive measures for the overall sample. 
TABLE 1. Variables in the model and some descriptive statistics
  Mean SD  
y Compensation amount awarded in judicial sentence in euros (on log scale). 8.260 1.306 
x1 1 if the victim’s vehicle is a car; 0=otherwise (e.g. van, motorbike, pedestrians). 0.596 0.493 
x2 1 if male; 0=otherwise. 0.509 0.502 
x3 Victim’s age (1 if age 0 to 9; 2 if 10 to 19; and so forth). 3.868 1.686 
x4 1 if the last medical report is the same as the initial medical report; 0=otherwise. 0.316 0.467 
x5 Number of sequelae (final medical report). 1.114 1.655 
x6 Sequelae number variation across reports (final medical report minus initial one). 0.009 0.917 
x7 Number of recovery days with disability for working (final medical report). 53.132 63.027 
x8 Number of recovery days without disability for working (final medical report). 37.596 59.699 
x9 
Variation in the number of recovery days unable to work across reports (final 
medical report minus initial one). 2.079 37.601 
x10 
Variation in the number of recovery days not unable to work across reports (final 
medical report minus initial one). 7.210 32.456 
x11.1 
1 if forensic doctor examines the victim and assesses the severity of his/her 
sequelae; 0=otherwise. 0.210 0.409 
x11.2 
1 if forensic doctor examines the victim and indicates his/her sequelae but doesn’t 
assess the severity of them; 0=otherwise. 0.342 0.477 
x11.3 1 if forensic doctor examines the victim and doesn’t award sequelae; 0=otherwise. 0.342 0.477 
x11.4 1 if there was no forensic report (civil procedure); 0=otherwise. 0.105 0.308 
n=92 judicial verdicts; N=114 claims. 
 
Regression variables refer to attributes of the victim such as gender (x2) and age 
(x3), type of victim’s vehicle and information collected in medical reports. Regarding the 
vehicle type, a dichotomous variable (x1) is included which indicates whether the casualty 
was travelling by car. As for the information from the final medical report, we consider the 
number of sequelae (x5) and the number of recovery days caused by the accident according 
to the medical expert’s examination. In Spain, legislation distinguishes between recovery 
days in which the victim was disabled for working purposes from those without disability 
for working. Both variables are included in the model regression (x7 and x8). In order to 
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avoid collinearity problems, the variations between reports rather than the raw information 
from the initial medical report were considered. In particular, we observe the variation 
across medical reports in the number of sequelae (x6) and the number of recovery days 
disabled and not disabled for working (x9 and x10). In addition, a control variable is added to 
indicate those claims in which only one medical report was produced (x4).  
Finally, four categorical variables related to the forensic performance have been 
defined, and these variables reflect the different ways in which the forensic doctor 
participates in the claim settlement process. The first one (x11.1) indicates whether the 
forensic doctor examined the victim, awarded him/her sequelae and assessed their severity. 
The second one (x11.2) refers to whether the forensic doctor examined the victim, awarded 
sequelae but didn’t assess their severity. The third option (x11.3) is that the forensic doctor 
evaluated the victim but didn’t assign him/her sequelae. The previous three categories refer 
to criminal suits. However, when the claimant files a tort suit the forensic doctor does not 
participate. This situation is considered in our fourth category (x11.4). It should be noted that 
we have included only these categorical regressors from the information collected in the 
forensic report to prevent civil lawsuits from being treated as missing values in the dataset.  
4. Insurer’s maximum offer of compensation  
Our goal is to estimate the maximum claim compensation to be offered by the insurer in 
the negotiation process. As previously remarked, we consider that the monetary 
compensation which would be awarded by the judge in the judicial proceeding is the 
maximum offer of compensation that should be made by the insurer in the negotiation. A 
log-linear model with nonspherical disturbances is implemented to estimate BI claims 
compensations awarded by courts. 
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4.1 Model specification 
Insurance data frequently present an unbalanced design, i.e. there is not the same number 
of observations per unit record of the data set (e.g. the number of covered risks in each 
individual policy). Log-linear models may be implemented for both balanced and 
unbalanced data, although the inference techniques used depend on the type of data (Khuri 
et al., 1998). In the current application, a log-linear regression model has been applied to 
estimate the claim compensation awarded in courts. Let us suppose that the data set 
consists of n subjects, where ni is the number of observations for the ith subject, 1 .i n£ £  
In our specification i indicates the judicial verdict (1 92)i£ £  and ni the number of claims 
settled in the ith verdict (1 3)in£ £ . Our database is unbalanced since not all judicial 
verdicts involve the same number of BI claims. The overall sample size N is obtained as 
the sum of all the claims settled in each verdict, 
92
1
114.i
i
n
=
=å   
Groupwise heteroscedasticity is due to the forensic performance. Note that the 
forensic examination is the only impartial evaluation of the victim’s severity, and thus it is 
likely to have a strong influence on the judge’s decision. At this point, we suggest that 
claims may have different variability in compensations depending on whether the forensic 
doctor participates or not in the claim settlement process, and also on the nature of this 
participation. The residual variance is parameterized as 2
ges , where g indicates the category 
of the variable related to the forensic performance x11.g with g=1,…,4 (as shown in Table 
1). The residual correlation among BI victims judged in the same court verdict is also 
considered. The correlation parameter is 2as . The model is specified as follows: 
 2 2( ), =1, ,92, 1 ,
gij ij i
y N i j n    x , : K  (1) 
  
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                             Working Papers 2008/07, 24 pages
14
where yij is the compensation amount (on log scale) awarded by the judge in the i-th 
judicial verdict to the j-th victim and with g-th residual variance, such that 1 4.g    
(p×1) is the vector of p unknown parameters and, finally, xij (1×p) is the design vector. 
Independence between judicial verdicts is assumed. 
Variance components are estimated by maximizing the restricted likelihood 
function (REML), 
1/2
' -1
1
det X V X
n
REML i i i ML
i
L L


	

   
 
 , where Xi(ni×p) and Vi(ni×ni) are the 
design and the covariance matrices of the i-th sentence, and MLL  the likelihood function 
(Verbeke and Molenberghs, 2000). REML estimators are generally preferred to maximum 
likelihood estimators due to their optimal minimum variance properties (for a detailed 
discussion, see Robinson, 1987; Searle et al., 1992). When variance components are 
replaced by their estimators, the empirical ˆ  is obtained as 
' -1 1 ' -1
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) .
n n
i i i i i i
i i

 
  X V X X V y  
Statistical inference is based on Wald and likelihood ratio tests (Khury et al., 1998). 
Confidence intervals on variance parameters are estimated by means of Satterthwaite’s 
approximation, which takes into account the fact that these parameters have a lower 
boundary at zero. 
4.2 Estimation results 
The results are presented in Table 2, which also shows the 90% confidence intervals for the 
parameter estimates. The Wald limits were estimated for the regression parameters and the 
Satterthwaite limits for the parameters of the residual variance. For unbalanced designs, 
Satterthwaite’s approximation can produce unacceptably liberal confidence intervals on 
2
  (Burdick and Graybill, 1992). For this reason, the Park-Burdick generalized confidence 
interval is provided in Table 2. Although alternative generalized confidence intervals on 
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2
  may usually be derived (Zhou and Mathew, 1994), Arendacká (2005) demonstrated 
that the generalized confidence interval provided by Park and Burdick performs best in 
terms of the confidence interval yielded.  
TABLE 2. Estimation results (90% confidence level) 
 Coeff. p-value Lower- bound  
Upper-
bound  
0 Constant 8.393 0.000*** 7.908 8.880 
x1  1 if the victim’s vehicle is a car; 0=otherwise (e.g. 
van, motorbike, pedestrians). 
-0.215 0.119 -0.443 0.013 
x2  1 if male; 0=otherwise. -0.766 0.004*** -1.152 -0.380 
x3  Victim’s age (1 if age 0 to 9; 2 if 10 to 19; and so 
forth). 
0.051 0.216 -0.019 0.121 
x4  1 if the last medical report is the same as the initial 
medical report; 0=otherwise. 
-0.878 0.001*** -1.222 -0.534 
x5  Number of sequelae (last medical report). 0.216 0.002*** 0.121 0.310 
x6  Sequelae number variation across reports (last 
medical report minus initial one). 
-0.270 0.013** -0.435 -0.105 
x7 Number of recovery days with disability for 
working (last medical report). 
0.009 0.000*** 0.006 0.011 
x8 Number of recovery days without disability for 
working (last medical report). 
0.006 0.005*** 0.003 0.008 
x9 
Variation in the number of recovery days unable to 
work across reports (last medical report minus 
initial one). 
-0.005 0.016** -0.008 -0.002 
x10 
Variation in the number of recovery days not 
unable to work across reports (last medical report 
minus initial one). 
-0.001 0.626 -0.006 0.004 
x11.3 1 if forensic doctor examines the victim and doesn’t 
award sequelae; 0=otherwise. 
-0.716 0.000*** -0.974 -0.457 
x12 1 if x2=0 y x4=0; 0=otherwise. -0.660 0.023** -1.109 -0.210 
2
  Correlation parameter 0.028 0.403 0.000 0.280 
1
2
  Residual variance if x11.1=1 0.768 0.001*** 0.478 1.475 
2
2
  Residual variance if x11.2=1 0.172 0.096* 0.069 1.201 
3
2
  Residual variance if x11.3=1 0.466 0.001*** 0.297 0.859 
4
2
  Residual variance if x11.4=1 0.664 0.021** 0.346 1.897 
N:114; 2= 12.490 (p-value: 0.029) 
*** indicates 1% significance level; ** indicates 5% significance level; * indicates 10% significance level. 
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The chi-square statistic was computed as minus two times the difference between 
the log restricted-likelihood for the model and the log restricted-likelihood when 2 0   
and 2 2 , .
g
g     The significance of the statistic indicates that a model with spherical 
perturbations is rejected.  
Regarding the estimated parameters of the regressors, all coefficients are 
significant, except those related to the victim’s vehicle (x1), the victim’s age (x3) and the 
variation across reports in the number of recovery days not disabled for working (x10). 
Many authors have shown that the victim’s age is positively correlated with the motor 
bodily injury severity (Lee and Abdel-Aty, 2005; Wang and Kockelman, 2005; Ayuso and 
Santolino, 2007). In contrast, and as pointed out in section 2.2, the monetary value 
stipulated in the Spanish legislative disability scale for the compensation assessment of the 
motor victim’s injury is inversely related to the victim’s age. Therefore, we suggest that the 
lack of explanatory capacity for this variable in the model could be due to the fact that the 
aforementioned effects counteract each other. Hence, older victims have more serious 
injuries resulting from the accident, but at the same time they receive less money for them. 
The remaining parameter influences on the claim compensation are as expected, for 
example, the bodily injury severity awarded in the last medical report is positively related 
to the final claim compensation, and the expected compensation decreases when the 
forensic doctor examined the victim and didn’t award sequelae. Note that two of the three 
variables from the initial medical report (x6, x9) have significant coefficients and with a 
negative sign. As a prudent practice, medical experts often consider a higher injury 
severity in the initial examination than in the final one, and thus x6 and x9 usually take 
negative values. Finally, whenever the final medical report is different from the initial one 
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or the victim is a woman, the expected claim compensation increases. However, when 
these features are observed at the same time, both marginal effects are partially 
counterbalanced by the influence of the joint variable x12.  
Unlike residual variance estimates, the correlation parameter estimate is near zero. 
This result is surprising since it would seem naive to believe that victims settled in the 
same judicial verdict are not correlated. Thus, we consider that the low value of the 
correlation parameter estimate is due to the sample design. Indeed, as was pointed out in 
section 3, only a few sample individuals (i.e. judicial sentences) have more than one 
observation (i.e. BI victims involved). Therefore, it makes sense to construct the upper-
limit estimate of the parameter with a confidence level. Note that the upper-bound of the 
Park-Burdick generalized confidence interval is around 0.3. 
4.3 Empirical estimation of the maximal compensation offer in the negotiation 
process
 
In this section an example of predicting the maximum insurer offer in the negotiation 
process is presented for two different scenarios. The upper-bound of the maximum offer, 
for a given confidence level, is also computed. Predictions are on a logarithmic scale and, 
therefore, they must be transformed to the original scale following the well-known 
characteristics of the lognormal distribution, i.e. if 2ln( ) ( , )N  :  then 
20,5[ ]E e    
and  2 22V ar[ ] 1 .e e      
Let us suppose that the insurance company wants to negotiate the BI compensation 
amount for the victims of two claims (A and B). Claim A concerns a 20-year-old man who 
suffered a motorbike accident. The initial and final medical reports are available to the 
insurer. In both medical reports the medical experts considered that the victim required 35 
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days for recovery and that he was temporarily disabled for work during this period. 
Furthermore, the victim did not suffer sequelae after recovery. The lawsuit follows a civil 
procedure and, therefore, the forensic doctor does not participate.  
Claim B concerns a 35-year-old woman who was injured in an accident with her 
car. Medical experts of the responsible driver’s insurance company examined the victim at 
the beginning and end of the recovery period, and in both examinations the same injury 
severity was awarded. According to these examinations, the woman had four sequelae 
resulting from the accident and was temporarily disabled for work for 50 days. In addition, 
she needed a further 15 recovery days after she became able to work. Since the victim filed 
a criminal suit against the insured driver for her injuries, she was also examined by a 
forensic doctor. The insurer knows that the forensic doctor awarded sequelae to her but did 
not assess their severity. Predictions of maximal compensation offers and upper-bounds for 
both claims are shown in Table 4. 
TABLE 4. Example of predicting the maximum compensation offer (in Euros) 
CLAIM A  CLAIM B 
Predicted
max offer 
Std. Err. 
Predic.*
Upper
bound±
 Predicted  
max offer 
Std. Err. 
Predic.*
Upper
bound±
on log scale    on log scale   
8.092 0.151 8.340  9.774 0.277 10.228 
on original scale   on original scale  
3305.69 502.018 4129.00  18258.11 5156.079 26714.08 
* For details of the prediction error variance, see Harville and Jeske (1992). 
±  95% confidence level. 
 
For claim A (Table 4, first three columns) the insurance company should go to 
court when the claimant does not accept compensation lower than €3305.69 in the 
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negotiation process. Furthermore, the insurer knows that in the event of a court ruling the 
compensation awarded by judicial verdict would be lower than €4129.00, with a 95% 
confidence level. In contrast, for claim B (Table 4, last three columns) the maximum 
compensation offered in the negotiation process rises to €18258.11, with the insurer being 
aware that the claim compensation awarded by a court ruling could reach €26714.08, once 
again with a confidence level of 95%.  
Therefore, we have shown that the presented methodology provides a guideline for 
estimating the maximum compensation for BI damages to be offered in the negotiation 
process. Indeed, we provide the insurance adjuster with a tool to determine the margin in 
the claim negotiation before going to court. Furthermore, since distributional assumptions 
are considered, the deviation from the expected maximum compensation cost with a 
confidence level can also be known by the adjuster.  
In this paper we have assumed that the correlation in residuals is caused by 
unobserved factors resulting from the same court verdict. Therefore, only those parameters 
which are common for all individuals were estimated. However, the presented 
methodology would still be valid when the cause of correlation was exclusively that 
compensations were settled by the same adjudicator. Since it is an observed factor it would 
also be necessary to estimate the subject-specific parameter, i.e. the deviation from the 
expected mean compensation associated with the aforementioned person. This would be 
achieved by including a random-effect in the model specification. 
6. Conclusions 
Motor insurers always negotiate with accident victims about financial compensation for 
injuries before taking the dispute to court. In this paper we develop a methodology that 
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assists insurance staff in the negotiation of bodily injury (BI) claims. In particular, we 
show how to estimate the maximum compensation that the insurer should be willing to 
offer the claimant in the negotiation process. In addition, the statistical basis of the 
suggested methodology enables the upper-bound maximal offer to be computed with a 
confidence level. By fixing the negotiation limit, the insurer provides staff adjusters with 
homogeneous and unequivocal norms for the settlement of disputes. Nevertheless, the 
maximum offer of compensation provided by our methodology supplements — but does 
not replace — the subjective claim assessment made by the insurance adjuster. Indeed, the 
methodology allows the insurer to assess the staff adjusters’ work, monitoring how much 
money is saved when claims are negotiated instead of settled by judicial verdict.  
A log-linear model is implemented to estimate the maximum offer according to 
attributes of the victim and characteristics of the claim record, including medical reports. 
The model specification includes residual correlation among BI victims involved in the 
same judicial verdict. Due to the unbalanced structure of the data, classical interval 
estimates on the correlation parameter are not reliable. This problem is overcome through 
estimation of the Park-Burdick generalized confidence interval. Empirical evidence has 
found that financial settlements awarded by courts present different variability according to 
the forensic participation.  
Finally, note that the suggested methodology could also have implications for the 
insurer’s reserving process since BI claims settled prior to a court ruling take on average 
less time to close. Therefore, reaching a negotiated agreement means reducing the time that 
the claim is provisioned within the company. 
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